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1Summary
Over the last couple of decades, the importance of transmission capacity for
telecommunications has grown. Enough upgraded, it can be used for both
telephony, data transmission, cable TV, provision of movies, and a number of
other services. For the provision of all these services, it is absolutely essential to
have access to a transmission medium. The existing networks are often built up
protected by a legal or de facto monopoly and have only recently been opened
for competition. But the former monopolists can maintain a dominant position
using their control of these networks.
A well-known concept in competition law is the doctrine about ”essential
facilities”. An essential facility is a facility, equipment or infrastructure which is
controlled by a dominant undertaking and is absolutely necessary for competitors
for being able to provide their services. The origin of the doctrine is found in the
US, and one of the most quoted tests for an essential facility is given in the
American case MCI v. AT&T from 1983. According to the court, four elements
must be established for applying the doctrine:
1. the essential facility is controlled by a monopolist;
2. the essential facility can not practically or reasonably be duplicated by 
the competitor;
3. the competitor is denied to use the facility; and
4. the owner could have provided access to the facility.
In EC law, there have been a number of cases regarding inter alia harbours and
programme listings necessary for the publishing of a TV guide. In two European
cases from 1998, European Night Services (CFI) and Bronner (ECJ), the
courts did not apply the doctrine since they did not find the facilities unduplicable.
In the latter case, the Court found that there were alternatives, ”even though they
may be less advantageous”.
In both US and the EC, telecommunications laws have been developed towards
competition and deregulation. The backgrounds are however different; in the US,
AT&T had a regulated private monopoly, while the European telecom sector was
characterized by public monopolies, often with both regulatory and service
functions.
The breakthrough for competition in the US was the division of AT&T after an
agreement in an antitrust case in 1982. AT&T’s local exchange carriers (BOCs),
were separated from AT&T and were prohibited from providing long-distance
services. To promote competition in the local services as well, the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 requires local exchange carriers to inter alia
afford access to some parts of their networks to competitors. If the local
exchange carrier is an ”incumbent local exchange carrier”, it also has to negotiate
in good faith with those carriers which want interconnection, provide
interconnection ”at any technically feasible point”, and provide non-discriminatory
access to network elements on an unbundled basis.
2In a number of directives from the middle of the 1980s up to the present, the EC
member states have been required to abolish all special or exclusive rights in the
telecom sector. In almost all member states, full competition was introduced in
1998.
Since the enactment of the Telecommunications Act in 1993, Sweden has been
further on the road towards an open market compared to most European
countries. This lead seems now to have been obliterated.
There are two main opportunities to get transmission access; interconnection and
by constructing a network of leased or owned lines. Interconnection means the
physical and logical linking of networks which makes it possible to communicate
with subscribers of another network. Under European law, telecommunications
organizations have a right and an obligation to interconnect with each other. When
constructing a network, the bottleneck is the local access network. There are a
number of more or less advantageous alternatives to the traditional
telecommunications network, the most suitable one is probably the cable TV
network. In a directive from 1999, the Commission requires that cable TV
networks and telecommunications network owned by a single operator are
separate legal entities. The other main alternative for a competitive service
provider is to lease the connections from the local switch to the customer and thus
take over that customer. In September 1999, the Post and Telecom Agency
handed over a proposal for new legislation in Sweden which would require Telia
AB to lease out these local connections to rates based on costs.
The Commission has in a notice clarified how it intends to apply the competition
rules in the telecom sector. It considers that the concept of essential facilities will
be of relevance, and notes that alternative networks like cable TV networks are
not satisfactory alternatives yet.
When establishing that an undertaking has a dominant position, the relevant
market must be defined. With a very narrow market definition, ”provision of
services to Mr X”, smaller network operators would also be required to give
access to their networks. For the customer, there are reasons for that market
definition. He could otherwise only subscribe to the network connected to his
house.
The Commission’s statement that cable TV networks are not satisfactory
alternatives yet is not in accordance with the Court’s ruling in Bronner. Cable TV
networks are already used for telephony services, They may be less
advantageous for the competitor, but so were Bronner’s alternatives as well.
It is in the interest of the whole society that transmission capacity is constructed. It
is therefore important that the legislation regarding the use of connections promote
investments in new such infrastructure. It is necessary with special rules giving
access to the former monopolists’ networks on rates based on costs to promote
competition, but in the long run it must be possible to make a profit on
investments in transmission capacity. Otherwise it will not be built.
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51 Introduction
”this is happening because of 
one thing and one thing alone: 
competition.”
William E. Kennard, chairman of 
the FCC, about the fast growing 
American telecom industry1
One of the most revolutionary inventions in the history of humanity is the
telegraph. For the first time it was possible to send a message over longer
distances without someone travelling with the message from the sender to the
receiver. Before the telegraph, a message from one continent to another could not
go faster than the fastest ship could sail. Later it became possible to transmit
”real-time speech”, for using the wording from the definition of voice telephony in
Directive 98/10/EC.2
Over the last couple of decades, the importance of these connections has grown.
Enough upgraded, they can be used for both telephony, data transmission, cable
TV, provision of movies, and a number of other services. One example of this
congruence of services is IP telephony, which is telephony transmitted as IP
packets. If the Internet is used for the transmission, it is called Internet telephony.
The development of IP telephony can also serve as an example of the fast growth
in the telecommunications sector.3
1.1 Statement of the problems
For the provision of all these services, it is absolutely essential to have access to a
transmission medium. The existing networks are often built up protected by a legal
or de facto monopoly and have only recently been opened for competition. But
the former monopolists can maintain a dominant position using their control of
these networks.
                                                
1 Kennard, William E., The Telecom Act at Three, Media Law & Policy, Volume VII, Number
2, Spring 1999, Communications Media Center at New York Law School,
http://cmcnyls.edu/mlp/kenn0499.html-ssi.
2 Directive 98/10/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 1998 on
the application of open network provision (ONP) to voice telephony and on universal
service for telecommunications in a competitive environment, O.J. 1998, L 101/24, article
2.2(e).
3 About the growth in the IP telephony sector: Nätverk & Kommunikation, IP-telefonin växer
lavinartat, Nätverk & Kommunikation, 27 May 1999,
http://nyheter.idg.se/display.pl?ID=990527-NOK5
6A well-known concept in competition law is the doctrine about ”essential
facilities”. An essential facility is a facility, equipment or infrastructure which is
controlled by a dominant undertaking and is absolutely necessary for competitors
for being able to provide their services. Under some circumstances the facility
owner has a duty to give access to the facility under non-discriminatory
conditions.
The same concept characterizes the telecom legislations after the liberalizations.
The purpose of these is to create competition where no such has existed before,
and the main means to achieve this is asymmetrical rules which lay a heavier
burden on the former monopolist. How the issue of access to transmission
facilities is dealed with in legislation and under the essential facilities doctrine is the
subject of this thesis.
Access to the local access network has over the past year been a current issue in
Sweden. Almost every telephone user has to be a subscriber of Telia AB, even
though he may have chosen another provider for his phone calls. In September
1999, the Post and Telecom Agency (PTS) laid a proposal for new legislation
which would give other providers access to the local network.
But will it promote investments with an essential facilities concept in a field with a
fast technical development? Should a company be allowed to own networks and
provide services at the same time? A recently adopted EC directive requires
telecommunications networks and cable TV network owned by a single operator
to be separate legal entities. Is that sufficient?
There are many questions; the goal of this thesis is to answer them.
1.2 Limitations, material and method
The words ”telecom and data transmission” may include a number of services.
Which service transmitted is however less interesting. It is the transmission and the
use of the line as an essential facility which is the subject of this thesis. This implies
that the telecommunications legislations examined are not exhaustively described.
They have e.g. a number of social provisions like rights for individuals to basic
telephone services. Such and other provisions regarding other aspects of the
telecom sector than the access to transmission capacity are not included in the
following.
The following is with a few exceptions regarding cable-based transmission. Hence
mobile telephony is excluded. The main issues of this thesis do apply to mobile
telephony as well, but a complete examination of that would also include a
number of other issues like spectrum allocation.
Issues about access to someone else’s property do inevitably include questions of
economics. Some attention will be drawn to these questions, although they will
not be exhaustively scrutinized.
7The material used consists primarily of US and EC judgements in essential facility
cases, directives and other EC documents, US and Swedish telecommunications
legislation, and books and articles regarding the issue. A substantial share of the
material is in accordance with the subject taken from the Internet. One reason for
that is the fast technical and legislative development in the telecom field. Books
which are only a couple of years old are often obsolete.
The doctrine of essential facilities will be examined. Its origin is found in the US,
but is now used at least all over the Western world. This thesis will be limited to
the US and the EC versions of the doctrine.
Next issue of this thesis is the statutory application of the doctrine in the
telecommunications field. Telecommunications laws from the US and the EC will
be examined. As an example of the latter, Sweden will be used.
1.3 Outline
Chapter 2 is devoted to explaining the concept of essential facilities. First US and
then EC doctrine will be examined, but the purpose is not to exhaustively describe
the whole doctrine. Hence the chapter is based on a subjective selection of cases
relevant to the issue of the thesis.
Chapter 3 examines in general the telecommunications legislations in the US, EC,
and as a subheading of the latter the Swedish one.
Chapter 4 is about the two main opportunities to get transmission access;
interconnection and by constructing a network of leased or owned lines. The EC
directives regarding both these areas are examined. Alternatives for building a
network will be presented for being able to consider whether parts of networks
can be considered as essential. The last part of chapter 4 examines PTS’
proposal for new legislation regarding Telia’s access network in Sweden.
Chapter 5 examines the Commission’s ”Notice on the application of the
competition rules to access agreements in the telecommunications sector” of
1998.
In Chapter 6, there is a discussion about transmission capacity as essential
facilities.
Chapter 7, finally, has some conclusions and thoughts about the future.
82 The essential facilities
doctrine
2.1 Introduction
Most products and services are produced in a number of separate processing
stages, so it is possible with an essential facility situation in almost any imaginable
market. Such a problem arise when one of these stages is controlled by one
company which also participate at another level.
                                  (a) up-stream facility               (b) down-stream facility
up-stream activity:            A                                         A                 B
down-stream activity:        A                 B                      A
end product:                       Consumers                            Consumers
Figure 14
If a manufacturer controls the only supply for a raw material and refuses to supply
its competitor or demands an unreasonable high price for it, it may be impossible
for the latter manufacturer to continue on the market. In both the US and the EC,
the doctrine of essential facilities under some circumstances requires the facility
owner to supply its competitor.
2.2 US law
In the US the doctrine is based on sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.5
Although the Court in the first case, Terminal Railroad, found a violation of
section 1, most essential facility cases are based on section 2.6
                                                
4 Figure 1 made after Ridyard, Derek, Essential Facilities and the Obligation to Supply
Competitors under UK and EC Competition Law, (1996) 8 ECLR 438, at 439.
5 Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890
6 ”Section 1.
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.
(...)
Section 2.
9The origin of the doctrine can be found in the Terminal Railroad case7 from
1912. It was not only the first, it can also be seen as the typical essential facility
case.
St Louis is surrounded by hills in a way which makes it impossible or very
expensive to build a railway to the city from the west in any other way than
through a narrow valley. The railway infrastructure in this valley was acquired by
Terminal Railroad Association, a company jointly owned by some, but not all, of
the railway companies transiting St Louis. The Association offered much more
favourable conditions to its members than other companies.
The Supreme Court found that ”the inherent conditions are such as to prohibit any
other reasonable means of entering the city”8 and ordered the Association to
provide equal and non-discriminatory access to all railway companies.
In the Otter Tail case9, municipalities wanted to establish their own electricity
distribution system. Otter Tail which owned the only transmission lines in the area
refused both to sell power at wholesale to the municipalities and to wheel power
from other suppliers through its lines.
The Court found that Otter Tail intentionally exploited its monopoly power in the
wholesale market to gain a competitive advantage in the retail market. Thus Otter
Tail was ordered to either sell its own power or wheel power supplied by other
wholesalers through its lines, as long as it did not impair its ability to provide its
own customers an adequate service.
In Hecht v. Pro-Football Inc.10 an American Football team demanded access to
a stadium which was used by another team. The court found that the use of a
stadium was essential for such teams; that a stadium of that size could not easily
be duplicated; and that it was possible for the new team to use it without
interfering with the old team.
A facility does not need to be indispensable to be essential; it is sufficient that a
duplication would be economically unfeasible if a denial of access is a great
detriment to potential market entrants.11 The limits from the opposite side are
given in City of Anaheim v. Southern California Edison Co.12 The city
demanded the respondent to wheel electricity from another supplier over its lines.
                                                                                                                           
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with
any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, (...)”
7 United States v. Terminal Railroad Association of St Louis, 224 US 383 (1912).
8 Ibid., at 409.
9 Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 US 366 (1973).
10 Hecht v. Pro-Football Inc., 570 F. 2nd 982 (D.C. Circuit 1977).
11 Blumenthal, William, quoted by Hedberg, Mattias, The Essential Facilities Doctrine after
Oscar Bronner - is the pendulum swinging?, master thesis, Faculty of Law, University of
Lund, Lund, Sweden, 1999, p. 11.
12 City of Anaheim v. Southern California Edison Co., 955 F. 2nd. 1373 (9th Circuit 1992).
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(cp. Otter Tail above) The Court did however not find that the city had shown
that refusal to grant access to the lines was anti-competitive, only that the city
might benefit if access was granted. It is thus not enough that access would benefit
the competitor, the refusal must be a great detriment to the entrant and concern an
exploitation of the facility owner’s monopoly power.
One of the landmark cases for the development of the essential facilities doctrine
is MCI v. AT&T13. To being able to provide long-distance telephone services,
MCI needed access to the networks of the Bell operating companies (BOCs),
which were controlled by the major long-distance provider AT&T. MCI was
refused interconnection and charged AT&T for having violated the Sherman Act.
The court found that four elements must be established for applying the essential
facilities doctrine:
1. the essential facility is controlled by a monopolist;
2. the essential facility can not practically or reasonably be duplicated by 
the competitor;
3. the competitor is denied to use the facility; and
4. the owner could have provided access to the facility.
All four elements were found established in this case.
2.3 European law
The EC essential facility doctrine is based on case-law to Articles 81 and 8214 in
the EC Treaty. Even though the doctrine is based on case-law at the European
level, it can be found in legislation as well at the national level. An example of that
is the Danish Competition Act.15
A substantial part of the essential facilities cases in the EC case-law concerns
harbours and airports. One of these is B & I Line v. Sealink16, where two
operators of ferry services between Great Britain and Ireland used a harbour
which was owned by one of them. In this case the Commission defines an
essential facility as:
                                                
13 MCI Communications v. AT&T, 708 F. 2nd 1081, 464 US 891 (1983).
14 These articles had the numbers 85 and 86 before the ratification of the Amsterdam Treaty.
15 ”16.- (1) The orders which the competition Council may issue under section 6(4) and
section 11(3), in order to bring the detrimental effects of an anti-competitive practice to an
end, can i.a. imply:
(...)
4) That access shall be granted to an infrastructure facility which is essential in order to
market a product or a service.”,
Konkurrenceloven (Competition Act) 1997 (Denmark), quoted after Møllgaard, H. Peter,
Access to Essential Facilities and the Danish Competition Act, Working paper 6-97,
Copenhagen Business School, København, Denmark, 1997, pp. 1-2.
16 B & I Line plc v. Sealink Harbours Ltd and Sealink Stena Ltd, (1992) 5 CMLR 255.
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”A dominant undertaking which both owns or controls and itself uses an essential
facility, i. e. a facility or infrastructure without access to which competitors cannot
provide services to their customers, and which refuses its competitors access to
that facility or grants access to competitors only on terms less favourable than
those which it gives its own services, thereby placing the competitors at a
competitive disadvantage, infringes Article 86 [Amsterdam article 82], if the other
conditions of that Article are met.”17
Before establishing that a company has a dominant position in a market, the
relevant market must be defined. The Commission defined the relevant market as
the ”central corridor” of ferry journeys between Great Britain and Ireland, an area
where the actual port was the only available one on the British side. Hence the
port constituted an essential facility.
In the second Sealink case18, a new operator demanded access to Sealink’s port
to make it possible for it to establish a ferry service. The first Sealink case
involved two existing competitors. The Commission found that the principle in the
first case was applicable on new operators as well.
In the Magill case19 the issue is access to intellectual property. The Court never
uses the term ”essential facilities”, and there are different opinions whether it is an
essential facilities case or not.
Three TV channels published separate weekly guides for their programmes; the
viewers had thus to buy three TV guides to get full cover. Magill intended to
publish a comprehensive TV guide, but the TV channels refused access to the
programme listings, a service they supplied to daily newspapers. The Court found
that;
1. there was no substitute to the programme listings for Magill, they were 
”the indispensable raw material” for TV guides;
2. the broadcasters refused the information;
3. there were no justifications for the refusal;
4. the refusal prevented the appearance of a new product for which there 
was a specific, constant and regular potential demand; and
5. the broadcasters reserved to themselves the secondary market of weekly 
television guides.20
The ownership of an intellectual property right can not in itself constitute a
dominant position, but the exercise of a such right may, in exceptional
circumstances, involve abusive conduct.21
                                                
17 Ibid., Paragraph 41.
18 Sea Containers v. Stena Sealink , Commission decision 94/19 EC of 21 December 1993,
O.J. 1994, L 015/8.
19 Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) and Independent Television Publications Ltd (ITP) v.
Commission of the European Communities (Magill case), Joined cases C-241/91 P and C-
242/91 P, (1995) ECR I-0743.
20 Ibid., Paragraphs 52-56.
21 Ibid., Paragraphs 46, 50.
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Glasl does not regard Magill as an essential facility case since he wants to restrict
the use of the doctrine to infrastructure or infrastructure related services.22
European Night Services23 seems to be the first case where the essential
facilities doctrine expressly has been used on a higher level than Commission
decisions. French, Dutch and British railway undertakings formed European Night
Services (ENS) to provide passenger railway services through the Channel
Tunnel. They agreed to provide ENS with locomotives, train crews and paths, but
when the Commission accepted the agreement it required the parent undertakings
to supply other international railway undertakings the same services under the
same terms as it provided ENS. ENS sought to have the provisions in the
Commission’s decision annulled and was successful in the proceedings. The CFI
found that the locomotives could not be regarded as essential facilities unless
ENS’s competitors without them ”would be unable either to penetrate the
relevant market or to continue operating on it.”24 The CFI added that the fact that
the undertakings behind ENS had been the first ones to acquire these locomotives
did not mean that they were alone in being able to do so.25
If the doctrine is widened in Magill, it gets more limited in Oscar Bronner26, the
first expressed essential facility case from the ECJ. In Austria there was only one
nation-wide system for home-delivering of daily newspapers. It was run by
Mediaprint for distribution of mainly its own two leading newspapers with a
market share of altogether 46.8 % of the circulation.
Bronner published a smaller daily newspaper and demanded Mediaprint to
include it in its home-delivery service against a reasonable payment. Bronner
argued that it would be entirely unprofitable for it to organize its own home-
delivery service and that postal delivery would not be an equivalent alternative
since it generally does not take place until late morning. Hence Mediaprint’s
delivery system constituted an ”essential facility” according to Bronner.
The Court referred to the Magill case in its judgement and stated that the refusal
of the service must ”be likely to eliminate all competition in the daily newspaper
market on the part of the person requesting the service and that such refusal
[must] be incapable of being objectively justified” and ”that the service in itself
[must] be indispensable to carrying on that person's business, inasmuch as there is
                                                
22 Glasl, Daniel, Essential Facilities Doctrine in EC Anti-trust Law: A Contribution to the
Current Debate, (1994) 6 ECLR 306, pp. 308, 311.
23 European Night Services Ltd (ENS), Eurostar (UK) Ltd, formerly European Passenger
Services Ltd (EPS), Union internationale des chemins de fer (UIC), NV Nederlandse
Spoorwegen (NS) and Société nationale des chemins de fer français (SNCF) v.
Commission of the European Communities, Joined cases T-374/94, T-375/94, T-384/94 and
T-388/94, (1998) ECR II-3141.
24 Ibid., Paragraph 212.
25 Ibid., Paragraph 216.
26 Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG v. Mediaprint Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH
& Co. KG, Mediaprint Zeitungsvertriebsgesellschaft GmbH & Co. KG and Mediaprint
Anzeigengesellschaft GmbH & Co. KG, Case C-7/97, (1998) ECR I-7791.
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no actual or potential substitute in existence for that home-delivery scheme.”27 But
the court found that Bronner had alternatives.
”it is undisputed that other methods of distributing daily newspapers, such as by
post and through sale in shops and at kiosks, even though they may be less
advantageous for the distribution of certain newspapers, exist and are used by the
publishers of those daily newspapers.”28
Further, the Court found that it would not be impossible or even unreasonable
difficult to establish a second home-delivery scheme, alone or in co-operation
with other publishers.
”It should be emphasised in that respect that, in order to demonstrate that the
creation of such a system is not a realistic potential alternative and that access to
the existing system is therefore indispensable, it is not enough to argue that it is not
economically viable by reason of the small circulation of the daily newspaper or
newspapers to be distributed.”29 It must at least be not economically viable to
duplicate the system even if the new system would distribute as many newspapers
as the existing one.30
2.4 Comments
Are there any major differences between the American and the European version
of the essential facilities doctrine? There are indeed at least one difference
between the wording of section 2 of the Sherman Act and Article 82 of the EC
Treaty. The former seems to regard the way that firms acquire monopoly power,
while the latter seems to regard the exploitation of monopoly power. Furse31
identifies that as a clear difference, but is the doctrine, which derives from the
legislation, divided into two subdoctrines by the Atlantic?
The small number of cases in the EU, especially from the highest instances, makes
it difficult to definitively identify any major differences. But the European version
of the doctrine seems to include a consumer perspective. In Magill, the Court
found that ”the refusal prevented the appearance of a new product for which
there was a specific, constant and regular potential demand”. The US version
seems to focus on competitors’ interest to provide products, while its European
counterpart also pays attention to consumers’ interest to get those products. For
the purpose of this thesis, it would however be sufficient to define an essential
facility using the test in MCI v. AT&T.
                                                
27 Ibid., Paragraph 41.
28 Ibid., Paragraph 43.
29 Ibid., Paragraph 45.
30 Ibid., Paragraph 46.
31 Furse, Mark, The ‘Essential Facilities’ Doctrine in Community Law, (1995) 8 ECLR 469, p.
470.
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1. the essential facility is controlled by a monopolist;
2. the essential facility can not practically or reasonably be duplicated by 
the competitor;
3. the competitor is denied to use the facility; and
4. the owner could have provided access to the facility.
The principal disadvantage with the doctrine, which most authors identify, is the
risk that it may reduce the incentives to invest. Why should those with the vision
to see the importance of a particular asset be forced to share it with others who
lacked that foresight?32
”a loose essential facilities analysis would penalize entrepreneurs who create their
own technologies that, once successful, would be required to share their assets
with late-arriving, would-be competitors. The doctrine would then become
entirely counterproductive in terms of economic efficiency by deterring
entrepreneurs from maximizing their competitive efforts and from creating such
”essential” assets in the first place.”33
Ridyard criticizes a British case, Southern Vectis, where a new bus operator got
access to the dominant bus operator’s bus station with the motivation that
”passengers are likely to assume that all available bus services start and end at the
bus station”. It was of course not impossible to construct a new bus station and
Ridyard points out the risk that the intervention ”might well preclude the possibility
that [the newcomer] could, if left to find its own way into the market, have
developed a better bus terminal location than the one owned by the incumbent.”34
It looks like there are reasons to limit the application of the doctrine to areas
where there is no technical progress, where it is impossible to create something
better than the existing facility. Mains for gas or electricity are obvious examples.
It is economically impossible to duplicate them, but if that would happen, the new
mains would not differ from the old ones.
Another field where the doctrine has advantages is in areas where the control of
the facility is not created by someone’s foresight, but is the rest of a legal
monopoly. Then the doctrine may create competition where there has not been
any before. Ridyard wants to limit the application of the doctrine to
”circumstances where competition does not and cannot be expected to operate,
                                                
32 The question is taken from Behr, David, Learning How to Share: The Essential Facilities
Doctrine Revisited, http://www.columbia.edu/~dmb69/complaw.html, 25/4/1999.
33 Kezsbom, Allen & Goldman, Alan V., No Shortcut to Antitrust Analysis: The Twisted
Journey of the ”Essential Facilities” Doctrine, Columbia Business Law Review, Vol. 1996 1:1,
http://www.ffhsj.com/firmpage/cmemos/0112041.htm, 25 April 1999.
34 Ridyard, Derek, Essential Facilities and the Obligation to Supply Competitors under UK
and EC Competition Law, (1996) 8 ECLR 438, pp. 443-444.
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and with assets that cannot reasonably be subject to effective competition.”35
Because of the position acquired by the former monopolist through the monopoly,
competition may need some help from the doctrine.
                                                
35 Ibid., p. 452.
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3 Telecommunications law
3.1 American telecom law
3.1.1 Before the break-up of AT&T; the regulated private
monopoly36
The patenting of the telephone by Alexander Graham Bell in 1876 was followed
by a number of court battles before the patents were secured by American Bell
Telephone (the forerunner to AT&T). When these patents expired in 1893, a
large number of competitors entered the market and in 1907 the independent
(non-AT&T) companies held a market share of 50 percent. The competing
telephone companies refused to interconnect with each other, so subscribers in
the same area could not call each other if they were not customers of the same
network. This gave some obvious practical problems, so in 1921 telephone
companies under the Willis-Graham Act were granted an exemption from the
antitrust legislation and were allowed to ”unify their services” by merging
competing telephone exchanges. In the first years, technology only allowed the
establishment of local networks. The technical breakthrough of long-distance
telephony reshaped the American telephone market. When AT&T constructed
the first long-distance network and refused interconnection with other companies,
these lost customers and were forced to merge with AT&T. By 1932 AT&T had
gained a market share of 80 % and had agreements with its still existing more or
less independent ”competitors”.
The telephone network was more or less seen as a natural monopoly and became
rather regulated, at the federal level by the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC), which was established by the Communications Act of 1934. AT&T
aroused however soon competition authorities’ interest. The rates of downstream
telephone services were regulated, but by artificially raising the prices of
telecommunications equipment sold to AT&T by its manufacturing arm Western
Electric, it could increase its profitability. An antitrust suit by the US Department
of Justice in 1949 ended up with a consent decree in 1956, in which AT&T could
keep its monopoly but had to accept some restrictions.
                                                
36 Facts about the early years from:
Kaserman, David L. & Mayo, John W., Government and Business, The Economics of
Antitrust and Regulation, The Dryden Press, Harcourt Brace College Publishers, Orlando,
Florida, USA, 1995, pp. 595-597.
Monopolkommission, Die Rolle der Deutschen Bundespost im Fernmeldewesen, 1st ed.,
Sondergutachten der Monopolkommission; vol. 9, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-
Baden, Germany, 1981, pp. 77-80.
Stehmann, Oliver, Network competition for European telecommunications, Oxford University
Press, New York, USA, 1995, pp. 123-125.
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3.1.2 The break-up of AT&T37
In  a number of decisions from 1956 and onwards, the FCC loosened the formal
monopoly of AT&T. New competitors arose in the market for long-distance
services, but were worse off than AT&T since the latter controlled the local
exchange services by its Bell Operating Companies (BOCs). In 1974 the US
Department of Justice filed an antitrust suit against AT&T, Western Electric, Bell
Telephone Laboratories, and, as co-conspirators, the BOCs. The Department of
Justice still saw local services as a natural monopoly, but argued that AT&T with
that monopoly could obtain or maintain a monopoly over the potentially
competitive markets of equipment and long-distance services. The defendants
were charged of having violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act by attempting to
”prevent, restrict, and eliminate competition”. But before a final decision had been
made, AT&T and the Department of Justice settled the case in an agreement in
1982. The settlement required AT&T to divest itself from the BOCs and forbade
the former to acquire the stocks or assets of the later.
The BOCs were on their side permitted to engage in any economic activity they
choose, except (1) interexchange (long-distance) services, (2) the provision of
information services, and (3) the manufacture of telecommunications products or
customer premises equipment. They were also required to provide non-
discriminatory access to the local exchange for all long-distance carriers and
information service providers.
In the divestiture, the twenty-two BOCs formed seven Regional Bell Operating
Companies (RBOCs), ”Baby Bells”, each of them with a part of the US as its
market for local exchange services.38
US was divided into 160 Local Access and Transport Areas (LATAs), generally
areas centered upon a city of reasonable size. BOCs were prohibited from
providing interLATA services, these could be provided by any long-distance
carrier, e.g. AT&T, but were free to provide intraLATA services. Intrastate
intraLATA services was an issue for state regulation, but in a majority of states
long-distance intraLATA services were open for competition. Local telephone
services were however still under conditions of monopoly.
                                                
37 Facts about the break-up from:
Davies, Andrew, Telecommunications and Politics, The Decentralised Alternative, Pinter
Publishers Ltd, London, UK, 1994, pp. 156-165.
Kaserman, David L. & Mayo, John W., Government and Business, The Economics of
Antitrust and Regulation, The Dryden Press, Harcourt Brace College Publishers, Orlando,
Florida, USA, 1995, pp. 598-607.
Stehmann, Oliver, Network competition for European telecommunications, Oxford University
Press, New York, USA, 1995, pp. 126-132.
38 Kaserman/Mayo uses the term BOC for the 22 companies before the AT&T break-up and
RBOC for the seven new companies the break-up created.
Stehmann uses the term RBOC for the pre-break-up companies and RHC (Regional Holding
Companies) for the seven new companies.
Alexander uses the term BOC for the seven new companies.
In this thesis Kaserman/Mayo’s terminology is used.
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It has been argued that this ”balkanised” system of LATAs is artificial and will be
growing even more artificial with the convergence of telecommunications and
computerized technology.39
3.1.3 Telecommunications Act 1996
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 was signed into law by the President on
February 8, 1996. It is mainly an amendment to the Communications Act of 1934
which also deals with other communications services like broadcasting of radio
and television.
The supervision of the telecommunications market is divided between the FCC
and the State Commissions. There is also a Joint Board consisting of three FCC
commissioners and four state commissioners from the states affected by the actual
case.40
The main concepts behind the act are competition and deregulation. ”No State or
local statute or regulation, or other State or local legal requirement, may prohibit
or have the effect of prohibiting the ability of any entity to provide any interstate or
intrastate telecommunications service.”41
3.1.3.1 Interconnection and other duties on telecommunications
carriers to promote competition
To provide competition, each telecommunications carrier has under section 251
the duty to interconnect directly or indirectly with other carriers’ facilities and
equipment and to not install network features, functions, or capabilities that do not
comply with the guidelines and standards established pursuant to the act.
Agreements on interconnection shall be submitted to the State commission for
approval.42
Telecommunications carriers which are engaged in the provision of telephone
exchange service or exchange access are called ”local exchange carriers” and
have as well the following duties:
(1) to not prohibit, or impose unreasonable or discriminatory conditions or
limitations on, the resale of their telecommunications services.
(2) to provide number portability. (the possibility for the customer to keep the
same telephone number when changing provider)
                                                
39 Huntley, John A. K. & Pitt Douglas C., Dead-Ends, Bottlenecks and Gridlock: Regulatory
Confusion on the US Telecommunications Superhighway, in Scott, Colin & Audéoud,
Olivier (eds.), The Future of EC Telecommunications Law, (Series of Publications by the
Academy of European Law in Trier; Vol. 19), Bundesanzeiger Verlagsges. mbH, Köln,
Germany, 1996, pp. 65-66.
40 Communications Act of 1934, as amended by Telecommunications Act of 1996,
subsection 410 (c).
41 Ibid., subsection 253 (a).
42 Ibid., subsection 252 (e).
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(3) to provide dialling parity. (the phone call will automatically be routed to a pre-
selected service provider without the use of a special code)
(4) to afford access to the poles, ducts, conduits, and rights-of-way of such
carrier to competing providers of telecommunications services.
(5) to establish reciprocal compensation arrangements for transport and
termination of telecommunications.43
A local exchange carrier can be an ”incumbent local exchange carrier” in a
specific area. That is a carrier which on the date of enactment of the
Telecommunications Act provided telephone exchange service in the area and
was deemed to be a member of the exchange carrier association or is a successor
or assign of a such member. FCC can also decide to treat a local exchange
carrier as an incumbent such if the carrier’s position makes that reasonable.44 As
an incumbent local exchange carrier it also inter alia has the following duties:
(6) to negotiate in good faith with those carriers which want interconnection.
(7) to provide interconnection with the local exchange carrier’s network on
reasonable and non-discriminatory terms for any requesting telecommunications
carrier, ”at any technically feasible point within the carrier’s network”. The service
must be equal in quality to the one provided to other carriers, including itself.
(8) to provide non-discriminatory access to network elements on an unbundled
basis at any technically feasible point.45
The rates for interconnection services and the use of network elements shall be
based on costs, be non-discriminatory and may include a reasonable profit.46
3.1.3.2 Special provisions concerning Bell operating companies
The BOCs were given a monopoly over the local exchange in the consent
decree47, but got restrictions to prevent them from using their position to gain
advantages in other markets. (see 4.1.2 above) In the 1996 Act, they lost their
local monopoly but are still under some restrictions. Under section 271, a BOC is
free to provide interLATA services which originate outside its own area48 and can
get permission from the FCC to provide such services from its own region too if
the BOC
 (a) has entered into one or more binding agreements about ”providing access and
interconnection to its network facilities for the network facilities of one or more
unaffiliated competing providers of telephone exchange service”, or
(b) has not received any requests for access and interconnection in ten months
after the Telecommunications Act was enacted, and the State commission has
                                                
43 Ibid., subsection 251 (b).
44 Ibid., subsection 251 (h).
45 Ibid., subsection 251 (c).
46 Ibid., paragraph 252 (d) (1).
47 United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982).
48 Communications Act of 1934, as amended by Telecommunications Act of 1996, paragraph
271 (b) (2).
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approved a statement of those terms and conditions the company generally offers
to provide such access and interconnection.49
To be approved by the State, such a statement must involve:
(1) Interconnection.
(2) Non-discriminatory access to network elements.
(3) Non-discriminatory access to the poles, ducts, conduits, and rights-of-way
owned or controlled by the BOC at just and reasonable rates.
(4) Local loop transmission from the central office to the customer's premises,
unbundled from local switching or other services.
(5) Local transport from the trunk side of a wireline local exchange carrier switch
unbundled from switching or other services.
(6) Local switching unbundled from transport, local loop transmission, or other
services.
(7) Non-discriminatory access to some information and services like directory
assistance services to allow the other carrier’s customers to obtain telephone
numbers.50
If the BOC is an Incumbent Local Exchange Carrier, it must however provide the
interLATA services which originate from its own region through an affiliate which
must be held on arm’s length distance. The affiliate must operate independently
from the BOC, keep separate books, have separate officers and employees and
is not allowed to obtain credit in a manner which would give the creditor recourse
to the BOC in case of default. The BOC must not discriminate between its
affiliate and other companies.51
3.1.3.3 Recent development
FCC issued in 1996 its Local Competition Order with federal standards for
pricing and provisions of interconnection services. These standards were
challenged for having violated the authority of the states, but were upheld by the
Supreme Court.52
The Baby Bells have had difficulties to fulfil the requirements for providing long
distance services, but a number of them will probably do it in a near future.53
                                                
49 Ibid., paragraphs 271 (b) (1), (c) (1).
50 Ibid., subparagraph 271 (c) (2) (B).
51 Ibid., section 272.
52 Communications Media Center at New York Law School, Supreme Court Upholds FCC's
Authority Regarding Some Local Telephone Market Issues, 25 January 1999,
http://cmcnyls.edu/bulletins/scufccal.html-ssi.
53 Communications Media Center at New York Law School, BellSouth's Bid to Provide Long-
distance to Louisiana Customers is Rejected, 15 October 1998,
http://cmcnyls.edu/bulletins/bsbldslr.htm.
Communications Media Center at New York Law School, Bell Atlantic Closer to Entering
New York Long Distance Telephone Market, 12 April 1999,
http://cmcnyls.edu/bulletins/bacenyld.html-ssi
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3.2 European telecom law
3.2.1 European Community law
3.2.1.1 Introduction
Unlike the US, the European telecommunications sector was characterized by
public monopolies, often with both regulatory and service functions. In a number
of countries the TO was a part of the post organization, as e.g. the German
Deutsche Bundespost. In 1985, the Court recognized in the British Telecom
case54 that the competition rules of the Treaty apply to telecommunications
administrations.
In 1987 the Commission published its Green Paper on Telecommunications55 with
a policy for liberalization of the markets for telecommunications services and
equipment. Its main principles were:
1. The de jure network monopolies in some member states were tolerated, 
but a standard for interconnection and network access for competitive 
service providers would be adopted (”Open Network Provision”, ONP). 2.
The de jure service monopolies would be restricted; only voice telephony 
could be provided with exclusive rights.
3. The de jure terminal equipment monopolies of the TOs would be 
abolished.
A directive for ensuring competition in the markets for terminal equipment came
the following year.56 Its main purpose was to create a European market for
equipment and required the member states to inter alia abolish monopolies for
importation and marketing.
The liberalization of the telecommunications market is mainly based on Article
8657 Directives issued by the Commission. These are completed with Council
Directives under Article 9558 to create an EU-wide telecom market.
The Commission’s right to issue directives under Article 86(3) requiring the
member states to abolish certain special or exclusive rights granted to their
telecommunications bodies was challenged but upheld by the Court.59
                                                
54 Italian Republic v. Commission of the European Communities (British Telecom case),
Case 41/83, (1985) ECR 873.
55 Green Paper on the development of the Common market for telecommunications services
and equipment. COM (87) 290, 1987.
56 Commission Directive 88/301/EEC of 27 May 1988 on competition in the markets for
telecommunications terminal equipment, O.J. 1988, L 131/73.
57 This article had the number 90 before the ratification of the Amsterdam Treaty.
58 This article had the number 100a before the ratification of the Amsterdam Treaty.
59 French Republic v. Commission of the European Communities, Case 202/88, (1991) ECR I-
1259, (terminal equipment), and
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To make its decisions more transparent, the Commission in 1991 issued its
”Guidelines on the application of EEC competition rules in the telecommunications
sector”60.
3.2.1.2 The Telecommunications Services Directive
The objective of directive 90/388/EEC61 was to open up the telecom market to
competition. It requires the member states to abolish all special or exclusive rights
granted to TOs for supply of telecom services. In its original version, voice
telephony was excluded. Those member states which maintained special or
exclusive rights for the network provision were required to ensure that these were
objective, non-discriminatory and published. The member states were further
required to separate the regulatory functions from the TO. An independent body
would be responsible for granting operating licences, controlling type approval
and technical specifications, allocation of frequencies and surveillance of usage
conditions.
By an amendment in 1994, special or exclusive rights in connections with satellite
services were abolished as well.62
Directive 90/388/EEC was substantially amended by directive 96/19/EC63, which
removed the exception for voice telephony and required the member states to
introduce full competition from 1 January 1998. Some states with less developed
or small networks were granted a longer transition period.
The Service Directive has been amended twice to make it possible to use cable
television networks for transmission of telecom services.64
Directive 97/13/EC gives a framework for general authorizations and individual
licences for telecommunications services. General authorizations or the absence of
authorization requirements are preferred. Individual licences may only be issued
                                                                                                                           
Kingdom of Spain, Kingdom of Belgium and Republic of Italy v. Commission of the
European Communities, Joined cases 271/90, 281/90 and 289/90, (1992) ECR I-5883,
(telecommunications services).
60 Guidelines on the application of EEC competition rules in the telecommunications sector,
O.J. 1991, C 233/2.
61 Commission Directive 90/388/EEC of 28 June 1990 on competition in the markets for
telecommunications services, O.J. 1990, L 192/10.
62 Commission Directive 94/46/EC of 13 October 1994 amending Directive 88/301/EEC and
Directive 90/388/EEC in particular with regard to satellite communications, O.J. 1994, L
268/15.
63 Commission Directive 96/19/EC of 13 March 1996 amending Directive 90/388/EEC with
regard to the implementation of full competition in telecommunications markets, O.J. 1996, L
074/13.
64 Commission Directive 95/51/EC of 18 October 1995 amending Directive 90/388/EEC with
regard to the abolition of the restrictions on the use of cable television networks for the
provision of already liberalized telecommunications services, O.J. 1995, L 256/49; and
Commission Directive 1999/64/EC of 23 June 1999 amending Directive 90/388/EEC in order to
ensure that telecommunications networks and cable TV networks owned by a single
operator are separate legal entities, O.J. 1999, L 175/39.
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where the holder is given access to scarce resources or has particular obligations
or rights. Conditions must under all circumstances be objectively justified in
relation to the service concerned, non-discriminatory, proportionate and
transparent.65 The Commission is supposed to work for a ”one-stop-shopping”
procedure, where it is possible to obtain individual licences or get general
authorizations notified at a single location in co-ordinated procedures.66
3.2.1.3 The Open Network Provision Directives
The purpose of the ONP Framework Directive67 is to harmonize conditions for
open and efficient access to and use of the public telecommunications network.
Such conditions must be based on objective criteria, be transparent and
appropriately published, guarantee equality of access and be non-discriminatory
in accordance with Community law.68 Restrictions on access can be made for
reasons based on essential requirements, which means security of network
operations and similar reasons.69
The ONP Framework directive identified areas for specific applications of ONP.
The first of these ONP area directives was directive 92/44/EEC about leased
lines.70 ”Lines” means in this context ”the telecommunications facilities which
provide for transparent transmission capacity between network termination
points” and the leasing does not include on-demand switching.71
The directive required the member states to ensure:
1. that information regarding offerings on technical characteristics, tariffs, 
supply and usage conditions, licensing and declaration requirements, and 
conditions for the attachment of terminal equipment is published;
                                                
65 Directive 97/13/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 April 1997 on a
common framework for general authorizations and individual licences in the field of
telecommunications services, O.J. 1997, L 117/15, article 3(2-3).
66 Ibid., article 13.
67 Council Directive 90/387/EEC of 28 June 1990 on the establishment of the internal market
for telecommunications services through the implementation of open network provision, O.J.
1990, L 192/1.
68 Ibid., article 3(1).
69 Council Directive 90/387/EEC of 28 June 1990 on the establishment of the internal market
for telecommunications services through the implementation of open network provision, O.J.
1990, L 192/1; as amended by Directive 97/51/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 6 October 1997 amending Council Directives 90/387/EEC and 92/44/EEC for the
purpose of adaptation to a competitive environment in telecommunications, O.J. 1997, L
295/23, article 3(2).
70 Council Directive 92/44/EEC of 5 June 1992 on the application of open network provision
to leased lines, O.J. 1992, L 165/27.
71 Council Directive 92/44/EEC of 5 June 1992 on the application of open network provision
to leased lines, O.J. 1992, L 165/27; as amended by Directive 97/51/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 6 October 1997 amending Council Directives 90/387/EEC
and 92/44/EEC for the purpose of adaptation to a competitive environment in
telecommunications, O.J. 1997, L 295/23, article 2(2).
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2. that when access to and use of leased lines is restricted in accordance with 
Community law those restrictions are imposed by the national regulatory 
authorities through regulatory means;
3. that a minimum set of leased lines is provided in order to guarantee a 
harmonized offering throughout the Community;
4. that TOs do not discriminate against other service providers; and
5. that tariffs for leased lines follow the basic principles of cost orientation 
and transparency.72
The second ONP area directive was 95/62/EC about voice telephony73, which
later became replaced by directive 98/10/EC74. The latter directive requires that
TOs with significant market power deals with reasonable requests from service
providers for access to the PSTN (the existing telecom network) at other
network termination points than the commonly provided ones.75
Two ONP Council Recommendations have also been issued regarding PSDS
and ISDN services.76
Directive 97/33/EC about interconnection77 will be examined under paragraph
4.1.
Number portability is required in directive 98/61/EC. The NRAs shall ”encourage
the earliest possible introduction” of it, it must however be available at latest by 1
January 2000 for those countries which had not been granted a longer transition
period until full liberalization. Telecommunications organizations with significant
market power shall be required to install facilities ”which allow the subscriber to
choose these services by means of pre-selection with a facility to override any
pre-selected choice on a call-by-call basis by dialling a short prefix.”78
                                                
72 Ibid., articles 3-10;
73 Directive 95/62/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 1995 on
the application of open network provision (ONP) to voice telephony, O.J. 1995, L 321/6.
74 Directive 98/10/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 1998 on
the application of open network provision (ONP) to voice telephony and on universal
service for telecommunications in a competitive environment, O.J. 1998, L 101/24.
75 Ibid., article 16.
76 Council Recommendation on the harmonized provision of a minimum set of packet-
switched data services (PSDS) in accordance with ONP principles, O.J. 1992, L 200/1; and
Council Recommendation on the provision of harmonized integrated services network
(ISDN) access arrangements and a minimum set of ISDN offerings in accordance with ONP
principles, O.J. 1992, L 200/10.
77 Directive 97/33/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 June 1997 on
interconnection in Telecommunications with regard to ensuring universal service and
interoperability through application of the principles of Open Network Provision (ONP), O.J.
1997, L 199/32.
78 Directive 97/33/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 June 1997 on
interconnection in Telecommunications with regard to ensuring universal service and
interoperability through application of the principles of Open Network Provision (ONP), O.J.
1997, L 199/32, as amended by directive 98/61/EC, O.J. 1998, L 268/37, article 12(5), (7).
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Deferment of these obligations may be requested if the concerned state can prove
that they would impose an excessive burden on certain organizations or classes of
organizations.79
3.2.2 Sweden
3.2.2.1 Introduction80
Unlike most European countries, Sweden has never had a de jure telecom
monopoly. In the beginning of the twentieth century, private companies owned the
networks in the larger cities. Stockholm had two networks, that of Telegrafverket
(the state) and that of Stockholms Allmänna Telefonaktiebolag. The competition
was sometimes so intensive that they refused interconnection with each other. In
1918, Telegrafverket bought its competitor and became almost single service
provider, but not until the 1950s the Swedish government (through its TO,
”Televerket”) had acquired the whole network. Anyone was still permitted to
construct his own network, but Televerket had a connection monopoly to its
public network which gave it a de facto monopoly regarding equipment and
services. Since 1980, this monopoly has been phased out and in two steps, taken
in 1989 and 1992, Televerket lost its regulatory functions to a regulatory board,
from 1994 called the Post and Telecom Agency (Post- och telestyrelsen, PTS).
3.2.2.2 Telecommunications Act 1993
The Swedish telecom market became liberalized by the Telecommunications Act
of 1993. Sweden has thus been further on the road towards an open market
compared with the rest of the European Union, United Kingdom excepted. The
European Economic Area Agreement only implied some technical adjustments to
the Swedish legislation.81 The directives issued after the Swedish act came into
force have implied some changes to the act, but the main principles are
unchanged. One of these principles is that the goal of ensuring access to efficient
telecommunications is supposed to be achieved through competition within all
parts of the sector.82 But according to a report from BT in June 1999, Sweden is
now behind comparable countries in Europe.83 The criteria of the examination
                                                
79 Ibid., article 20(2).
80 Historical background from Trägård, Lars / Boström, Karoline / Camitz, Marianne /
Eriksson, Margaretha, Telelagstiftningen, Norstedts Juridik AB, Stockholm, Sweden, 1996,
pp. 36-38; and
Telelag (SOU 1992:70), Report from the Telecommunications Law Commission, pp. 127-128.
81 Scott, Colin, Current Issues in EC Telecommunications Law, in Scott, Colin & Audéoud,
Olivier (eds.), The Future of EC Telecommunications Law, (Series of Publications by the
Academy of European Law in Trier; Vol. 19), Bundesanzeiger Verlagsges. mbH, Köln,
Germany, 1996, p. 37.
82 Telelag (Telecommunications Act) (1993:597), reprinted SFS 1997:397, amended 1995:465,
1995:1368, 1996:416, 1997:397, 1998:486, 1998:728, 1998:1569, 1999:577 and 1999:578. English
version from www.pts.se/lagar/teleact.htm, section 3.
83 TeleAffärer, Sveriges telemarknad fortsätter att halka efter i avregleringen, TeleAffärer, 15
June 1999, http://nyheter.idg.se/display.pl?ID=990615-TA1
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were efficient regulation, fair interconnection, access to the market, and non-
discrimination. Sweden came as number nine of ten compared countries, but the
introduction of dialling parity and number portability by an amendment84 to the
Act in 1999 is seen as an important progress.
3.2.2.2.1 Notifications and licences
If the PTS has not made an exemption, providers are required to notify the
authority before providing within a public telecommunications network:
1. telephony services to a fixed termination point
2. mobile telecommunications services
3. other telecommunications services requiring allocation of capacity from 
the numbering plan for telephony
4. network capacity.85
If the activity is of a considerable extent, the provider requires a licence. PTS may
however grant an exemption if there are special reasons for that.86
A licence will normally be granted on application; a licence ”shall be granted
unless the applicant is not capable of pursuing the activity on a permanent basis
and with adequate capacity and quality.”87
If the activity is pursued in direct violation of the Act or conditions issued under it,
the PTS may revoke a licence.88
A licence may be subject to conditions concerning obligations for the licence-
holder to inter alia:
1. provide on certain conditions telephony services to a fixed termination 
point to anyone requesting such service.
2. provide, having regard to available capacity and on certain conditions, 
network capacity to anyone so requesting.
3. conduct the activity permanently and with good capacity and quality.
4. publish on reasonable conditions in its own telephone directory 
information about subscriptions that is not confidential.
5. without special compensation, maintain automatic telephones, to the extent
which as regards number and geographical coverage satisfies public needs.89
                                                
84 Telelag (Telecommunications Act) (1993:597), reprinted SFS 1997:397, amended 1995:465,
1995:1368, 1996:416, 1997:397, 1998:486, 1998:728, 1998:1569, 1999:577 and 1999:578. English
version from www.pts.se/lagar/teleact.htm, sections 37-42.
85 Ibid., section 5,
combined with
Teleförordning (Telecommunications Ordinance) (1997:399), sections 2, 4.
86 Telelag (Telecommunications Act) (1993:597), reprinted SFS 1997:397, amended 1995:465,
1995:1368, 1996:416, 1997:397, 1998:486, 1998:728, 1998:1569, 1999:577 and 1999:578. English
version from www.pts.se/lagar/teleact.htm, sections 7, 10.
87 Ibid., section 13.
88 Ibid., section 12.
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The tariffs of a dominant licence-holder for provision of network capacity or
telephony services between fixed termination points shall be based on costs, but
the Government may prescribe that tariffs for the latter must not exceed a certain
level.90
3.2.2.2.2 Interconnection
A provider which is subject to the obligation of notification or is a considerable
provider of other services within a public telecommunications network, is ”liable
on request to facilitate interconnection” with any other notified provider. In
exceptional cases, an exemption from the obligation to interconnect may be
granted by the PTS. The compensation for interconnection of telephony services
shall be fair and reasonable in relation to the performance costs. For non-
telephony services the compensation may be under market terms.91
3.3 Comments
From different backgrounds, the regulated private monopoly respectively the
public monopoly, both US and Europe have seen a development towards
competition and deregulation. The American concept of creating full competition
in long-distance services by separating the provision of them from the former local
monopolists has no equivalent in Europe where the dominating TOs are free to
provide a full range of services. The American legislator has chosen to use a
carrot; if the BOCs make agreements about giving access to their networks in an
unbundled manner, they can enter the profitable long-distance market. This
concept of negotiation implies that the stage of competition may differ between
the states. The main impression is however that the US is further on the road.
Some of the requirements which were introduced in the US by the legislation of
1996 came into force in the EU with the introduction of full competition 1 January
1998. Others, like number portability and dialling parity, will be required later.
The opening of the public local network has not been the subject of any EC
directives yet. Nevertheless some member states have more far-reaching
requirements on their dominant TOs.
                                                                                                                           
89 Ibid., section 15.
90 Ibid., sections 28, 31.
91 Ibid., section 32.
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4 Access to the transmission
network in Europe
Telecommunications can be routed from one service provider through another
one’s network by interconnection. The second, and more obvious way to get
access to a network is to build it of leased or self-constructed connections. These
two means of getting access to a network are examined in this chapter. Regarding
the latter, this statement will concentrate on the local access network. According
to the PTS, there will be relatively good conditions for competition over the long-
distance network in Sweden in the future.92 Transmission capacity is at the
moment provided by inter alia Telia AB, Banverket, Svenska Kraftnät and
Teracom. But many operators still consider that the competition in Sweden is not
entirely satisfactory, since the number of network providers is low and those who
can provide connections in the whole country are even fewer.93
4.1 Interconnection services
Without interconnection agreements it would not be possible to make a phone call
to someone who is a customer of another network. The significance of it is
obvious, especially for service providers with smaller networks and their
subscribers. According to the European definition,
”‘interconnection’ means the physical and logical linking of telecommunications
networks used by the same or a different organization in order to allow the users
of one organization to communicate with users of the same or another
organization, or to access services provided by another organization. Services
may be provided by the parties involved or other parties who have access to the
network”.94
The concept of interconnection did not arise from the liberalization. The national
TOs have had interconnection agreements with each other regarding international
calls as long as such calls have been possible.
                                                
92 Post- och telestyrelsen, Förslag till ändring i telelagen (1993:597), Post- och telestyrelsen,
Stockholm, Sweden, 1999, www.pts.se/Aktuellt/accessforslag10.pdf, p. 1.
93 Öhrlings PricewaterhouseCoopers, Den svenska marknaden för telekommunikation 1998,
En analys utförd på uppdrag av Post och Telestyrelsen, Öhrlings PricewaterhouseCoopers,
Stockholm, Sweden, 1999, www.pts.se/Aktuellt/telemark1998.pdf, p. 62.
94 Directive 97/33/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 June 1997 on
interconnection in Telecommunications with regard to ensuring universal service and
interoperability through application of the principles of Open Network Provision (ONP), O.J.
1997, L 199/32, article 2.1(a).
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4.1.1 The duty to interconnect in European law
Article 3 in the 97/33/EC directive requires the member states to remove any
restrictions preventing TOs from negotiating interconnection agreements with each
other.
TOs which are authorized to provide public telecommunications networks and/or
publicly available telecommunications services ”shall have a right and, when
requested by organizations in that category, an obligation to negotiate
interconnection with each other for the purpose of providing the services in
question, in order to ensure provision of these networks and services throughout
the Community”. The NRA can temporarily limit the obligation on a case-by-case
basis under some circumstances.
If the TO has a significant market power, it ”shall meet all reasonable requests for
access to the network including access at points other than the network
termination points offered to the majority of end-users”. The TO is presumed to
have a significant market power if it has a share of more than 25 % in the area
where it is authorized to operate. The NRA can both determine that TOs with
less than 25 % has significant market power and that TOs with more are not.95
Those TOs with significant market power shall ”apply similar conditions in similar
circumstances to interconnected organizations providing similar services”, and
provide interconnection facilities to others under the same conditions as for their
own services. All necessary information must be available on request and
interconnection agreements must be communicated to the relevant NRAs.96
Agreements on interconnection may not interfere with the security of network
operations, the maintenance of network integrity, interoperability of services, or
protection of confidential data (essential requirements). But the need to meet the
requirement of security of network is not a valid reason for refusal to negotiate
terms for interconnection and the conditions must be proportionate and non-
discriminatory in nature and based on objective criteria identified in advance.97
TOs with significant market power shall be required to ”keep separate
accounts for, on the one hand, their activities related to interconnection - covering
both interconnection services provided internally and interconnection services
provided to others - and, on the other hand, other activities, so as to identify all
elements of cost and revenue, with the basis of their calculation and the detailed
attribution methods used, related to their interconnection activity, including an
itemized breakdown of fixed asset and structural costs.”98
                                                
95 Ibid., article 4.
96 Ibid., article 6.
97 Ibid., article 10.
98 Directive 97/33/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 June 1997 on
interconnection in Telecommunications with regard to ensuring universal service and
interoperability through application of the principles of Open Network Provision (ONP), O.J.
1997, L 199/32, article 8(2); and
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4.1.2 Charges for interconnection
Organizations operating the public telecommunications networks and TOs with a
significant market power are required to follow the principles of
transparency and cost orientation when charging for interconnection services. The
burden of proof that charges are derived from actual costs including a reasonable
rate of return on investment lies with the organization providing interconnection to
its facilities. The NRA may request the facility operator to provide full justification
for its interconnection charges and can adjust them if required.99
Interconnection charges must be sufficiently unbundled so the operator which uses
the interconnection services does not have to pay for anything else than the
requested service.100
The NRAs shall ensure the publication of a reference interconnection offer.101 The
Commission has also given some recommendations on pricing to the NRAs with
recommended maximum interconnection charges.102
4.2 The local access network
Competition is considered to have given new services and in some cases lower
prices. Fixed local telephony is however in Sweden an exception and that is
considered to be a consequence of the former monopolist’s control of the access
network.103 Competitors’ possibility to provide local telephony is dependent of
the level of Telia’s interconnection rates. These have declined over the recent
years104, but Telia’s control of the access network is still considered to be an
obstacle.
                                                                                                                           
98/322/EC: Commission Recommendation of 8 April 1998 on interconnection in a liberalised
telecommunications market (Part 2 - Accounting separation and cost accounting), O.J. 1998,
L 141/6.
99 Directive 97/33/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 June 1997 on
interconnection in Telecommunications with regard to ensuring universal service and
interoperability through application of the principles of Open Network Provision (ONP), O.J.
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101 Ibid., article 7 (3), paragraph 1.
102 98/195/EC: Commission Recommendation of 8 January 1998 on interconnection in a
liberalised telecommunications market (Part 1 - Interconnection pricing), O.J. 1998, L 073/42,
amended by 98/511/EC: Commission Recommendation of 29 July 1998 amending
Recommendation 98/195/EC on interconnection in a liberalised telecommunications market
(Part 1 - Interconnection pricing), O.J. 1998, L 228/30.
103 Post- och telestyrelsen, Publik konsultation avseende konkurrenssituationen inom
accessnätet, Post- och telestyrelsen, Stockholm, Sweden, 1999,
www.pts.se/Aktuellt/accesskonkurrens.pdf, p. 1.
104 Öhrlings PricewaterhouseCoopers, Den svenska marknaden för telekommunikation 1998,
En analys utförd på uppdrag av Post och Telestyrelsen, Öhrlings PricewaterhouseCoopers,
Stockholm, Sweden, 1999, www.pts.se/Aktuellt/telemark1998.pdf, p. 75.
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Access to an access network is especially important for the providing of services
like local telephony, subscription, ISDN and broadband access. The importance
of mobile telephony over the GSM network as an alternative for fixed voice
telephony may increase if the rates decline, but the speed of the mobile network
has so far been too low to be an alternative for data communication.
There are three alternatives for a competitive service provider to get local access;
constructing a new network, using existing alternative networks, or getting access
to the existing access network.
4.2.1 The service provider constructs an alternative access
network
4.2.1.1 Cable-based local network
It would be rather expensive for a competitive service provider to duplicate
Telia’s access network. In the 1980s, efforts were made in the UK to create a
second network by a policy of duopoly. Mercury was granted a network license
which gave it a special right to construct the second network after BT’s. In 1991
the duopoly policy was brought to an end and in 1994 the telecommunications
market was fully liberalized.105
Demands for connections different from the existing ones may make a new
network profitable. A private company plans to construct broadband connections
to a substantial share of Swedish homes. These connections are planned to be
used for telephony, TV, radio and Internet.106 Telia has similar plans.107
4.2.1.2 Wireless local loop
A less expensive alternative than constructing a cable network is to replace it with
a wireless connection between the customer and the switch. Telenordia plans to
provide access in Sweden by a radio technology called LMDS (Local Multipoint
Distribution Service) from the second half of 1999. The connection can be used
for both telephony and internet access, the latter with a speed of 1 Mbit/s, and in
the future for distribution of digital television.108
                                                
105 Öhrlings PricewaterhouseCoopers, Kartläggning av tele- och IT-infrastruktur, Öhrlings
PricewaterhouseCoopers, Stockholm, Sweden, 1999, www.pts.se/Aktuellt/infrastruktur.pdf,
p. 72.
106 Sydsvenska Dagbladet, Uppstickare lockar med gratis telefoni, Sydsvenska Dagbladet, 25
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4.2.2 Existing alternative access networks
4.2.2.1 The cable television network
Given the high costs of building an alternative local network, one of the most
realistic alternatives is to use an upgraded cable TV network. BT’s market share
was e.g. reduced far quicker by the arrival of the cable companies than the
previous (primarily Mercury’s) challenges had achieved.109
The cable TV network can provide a capacity of 256 kbit/s-10 Mbit/s110, and
Öhrlings PricewaterhouseCoopers predicts that it will be a common form of
access in those areas which already have such networks, provided that the grade
of the cable is sufficient.111
The Commission has adopted two directives for making it possible and easier to
use the cable TV network for telecommunications. The first one, 95/51/EC112,
inter alia required the member states to (1) abolish restrictions on the use of
cable TV networks for the provision of telecommunications services, (2) ensure
that interconnection between cable TV networks and the public
telecommunications network is authorized for such purpose, (3) ensure
accounting transparency and non-discrimination, and (4) that operators with
exclusive rights keep the financial accounts of their telecommunications network
infrastructure and cable TV network infrastructure separated.
The two main purposes are to increase competition in the local access market and
give the operators incentives to upgrade their networks so they can use them for a
wider range of services. Tariffs for transmission are stated to be ten times higher
in the European Union than for equivalent services in the US.
The Commission found, however, this to be insufficient and in its second directive,
99/64/EC113, it requires that cable TV networks and telecommunications network
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owned by a single operator are separate legal entities. The requirement is
complied with if the cable TV operations are transformed to a fully-owned
subsidiary. One of the reasons for the directive is two studies which showed that
”the joint ownership of telecommunications networks and cable TV networks by
a single enterprise, without a high degree of competition in the local access
markets, slows down the development towards a full multimedia infrastructure”.114
There are, according to the Commission, no incentives for upgrading networks
since a substantial improvement in either network may lead to a loss of business
for the other.
In the US, local telephony over the cable TV network will be provided from the
end of 1999.115
4.2.2.2 Electricity lines
Öhrlings PricewaterhouseCoopers predicts that the use of electric mains for
internet and telecom access will mainly be on the experimental stage during the
next years.116 In tests in Malmö and Stockholm they are used for internet access,
initially with a speed of 1 Mbit/s in each direction. Users connected to the same
                                                                                                                           
Each Member State shall ensure that no telecommunications organisation operates its cable
TV network using the same legal entity as it uses for its public telecommunications network,
when such organisation:
(a)  is controlled by that Member State or benefits from special rights; and
(b)  is dominant in a substantial part of the common market in the provision of public
      telecommunications network and public voice telephony services; and
(c)  operates a cable TV network established under special or exclusive right in the same
      geographic area.”
Bartosch pointed out, after the publishing of the draft to the 1999 Directive, that there may
be uncertainity whether the Commission is entitled to adopt a such directive under article
86(3) (pre-Amsterdam 90(3)). This article gives the Commission power to enact directives
regarding ”public undertakings and undertakings to which Member States grant special or
exclusive rights”. According to Bartosch, there are no exclusive rights since the
liberalization of the telecommunications markets January 1, 1998, and the Court has never
given any definition of the concept ”special rights”.
Bartosch, Andreas, E.C. Telecommunications Law: The New Draft Directive on the Legal
Separation of Networks, (1998) 8 ECLR 514.
In the recital to the Directive, the Commission argues that whilst the Community law
provides for the withdraval of exclusive rights in the telecom market, the former monopolists
still benefit from certain special rights. Recital (7).
114 Commission Directive 1999/64/EC of 23 June 1999 amending Directive 90/388/EEC in order
to ensure that telecommunications networks and cable TV networks owned by a single
operator are separate legal entities, O.J. 1999, L 175/39, recital (4).
115 Communications Media Center at New York Law School, AT&T Moves Further into
Local Phone Service with Two New Deals , 5 February 1999,
http://cmcnyls.edu/bulletins/attlptwi.html-ssi.
116 Öhrlings PricewaterhouseCoopers, Kartläggning av tele- och IT-infrastruktur, Öhrlings
PricewaterhouseCoopers, Stockholm, Sweden, 1999, www.pts.se/Aktuellt/infrastruktur.pdf,
p. 50.
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electric station share this capacity. In Stockholm the internet services are
provided by Tele2.117
4.2.2.3 Digital broadcasting of television
A network for broadcasting of digital television can be used for data transmission.
The return channel from the user is planned to use an ordinary modem or
GSM.118
4.2.3 Access to the public switched telephone network
Another alternative for a new operator to avoid the costs of constructing new
infrastructure is to get access to the existing access network, the public switched
telephone network (PSTN). Using digital technologies like ISDN (Integrated
Services Digital Network) or xDSL (x Digital Subscriber Line), a higher capacity
can be achieved in the existing copper access network. The signals are
transmitted in another form which requires upgraded exchanges and new
equipment but not necessarily new cables. One of the xDSL technologies, ADSL
(Asymmetrical Digital Subscriber Line), allocates the transmission capacity in an
asymmetrical manner, so the capacity for receiving is higher than the one for
sending. An ordinary Internet user downloads much more information than he
sends. In Sweden Telia AB is testing ADSL with a capacity of 150 kbit/s for
sending and 2 Mbit/s for receiving.119 Öhrlings PricewaterhouseCoopers predicts
that ADSL will be the dominant form of broadband access (more than 1 Mbit/s)
in urban areas in the next five years.120 (The normal definition of ”broadband” is
more than 2 Mbit/s.) To sum up, access to the traditional network is still valuable.
With Local loop unbundling (LLUB) the competitive TO leases the connection
from the local switch to the customer and thus takes over that customer. There
are two types of LLUB; access to the transmission medium in the local loop and
bitstream access. With the former, the new service provider takes over the
physical transmission medium (the cable) and therefore can connect its own
equipment at both sides of it; with the latter, the new service provider takes over
transmission capacity (bitstream).121
The local loop will be fully unbundled in the Netherlands from next year. But while
the rates initially will be based on costs, they will gradually rise to allow the former
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118 Öhrlings PricewaterhouseCoopers, Kartläggning av tele- och IT-infrastruktur, Öhrlings
PricewaterhouseCoopers, Stockholm, Sweden, 1999, www.pts.se/Aktuellt/infrastruktur.pdf,
p. 47.
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monopolist TO to make a profit on the service by 2004. This model is supposed
to encourage alternative carriers to build their own infrastructure.122 Other
European countries with more or less unbundled access networks are Denmark
and Germany.
4.2.3.1 Local loop unbundling in Sweden
In the middle of 1999, the most common opinion is that no alternative network is
estimated to be able to compete with Telia’s access network in the foreseeable
future.123
According to PTS, the current Swedish legislation does not require LLUB.124
By the definition of interconnection in the Telecommunications Act, it means ”the
physical and logical connection of telecommunications networks”125. LLUB does
imply physical but not logical connection.
Since January 1999, Telia is leasing out parts of its access network, but the rates
are based on market prices and not costs.126 Some changes have however been
announced in order to convince the Commission to approve the Telia-Telenor
merger.127
PTS identifies a number of disadvantages with LLUB; these are inter alia: less
incentives to build alternative infrastructure; elimination of already constructed
alternative networks; and difficulties for Telia to modernize its network if parts of
it are leased out to others. With bitstream access, the latter problem is avoided
since Telia then would keep total control over the network.128
On 16 September 1999, PTS handed over a proposal for new legislation to the
Swedish Government.129 PTS proposes that a licence to pursue
telecommunications activities may be subject to conditions concerning obligations
for the licence-holder to, if the TO is notified to the Commission as having
significant market power in Sweden, on reasonable request and under equivalent
terms give access to access network to telecommunications operator which
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provides telecommunications services within a public telecommunications
network.130
This implies that only Telia would be obligated to give access to its access
network. PTS considers that other operators should not have to onerous
obligations before they have attained a significant market power within a relevant
market. Otherwise their will to invest in new networks might be influenced.131
With ”reasonable request”, PTS means that it must be reasonable from
economical and technical points of view that the network owner undertakes the
provision.132
This obligation would include both access to the transmission medium and
bitstream access.133
The rates for the access are proposed to be based on costs. The intention is to
promote service competition, but not remove incentives to invest in new
infrastructure.134
The competitive service provider would be permitted to locate its equipment in
the network provider’s premises. The compensation must be fair and reasonable
with regard to the costs. If an agreement has not been possible to reach on a
voluntary basis, PTS would decide over the enjoyment and the conditions for
it.135
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5 Application of competition
rules in the telecom sector
In its Notice136, the Commission clarifies how it intends to apply the competition
rules to access agreements. In this chapter, the notice will be examined while the
author of this thesis will make some comments to it in chapter 6.
The Commission points out that a number of competition rules also exists in the
ONP framework and a proper application of these often avoid the need for the
application of the general ones.137 But it also points out that the competition rules
still apply and that ”it is obvious that Community acts adopted in the
telecommunications sector are to be interpreted in a way consistent with
competition rules”.138
5.1 Essential facilities
The Commission considers with a reference to the cases in the transport sector
that the concept of essential facilities will be of relevance in many cases
concerning the duties of dominant TOs, and that a company controlling an
essential facility enjoys a dominant position within the meaning of Article 82.139
When determining whether access should be ordered under the competition rules,
the Commission intends to consider if the dominant company has not fulfilled its
duty to not discriminate, or the following essential facility test is met:140
(a) access to the facility in question is generally essential in order 
for companies to compete on that related market;
It is not sufficient that the access would be more advantageous, refusal 
of it must lead to the proposed activities being made either impossible 
or seriously and unavoidably uneconomic. (cp. with Bronner above.)
Alternative networks like cable TV networks are however not yet 
considered to be a satisfactory alternative.
(b) there is sufficient capacity available to provide access;
(c) the facility owner fails to satisfy demand on an existing service 
or product market, blocks the emergence of a potential new 
service or product, or impedes competition on an existing or 
potential service or product market;
                                                
136 Notice on the application of the competition rules to access agreements in the
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137 Ibid., paragraph 58.
138 Ibid., paragraph 57.
139 Ibid., paragraphs 68-69, 88.
140 Ibid., paragraph 91.
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(d) the company seeking access is prepared to pay the reasonable 
and non-discriminatory price and will otherwise in all respects 
accept non-discriminatory access terms and conditions;
(e) there is no objective justification for refusing to provide access.
Objective justifications could include an overriding difficulty of 
providing access, the need for a facility owner to have sufficient time 
to introduce a new product on the market for which the investment 
was made, or technical unfeasibility to grant access at the requested 
point. Access must otherwise be granted at the most suitable point for 
the requesting party.141
5.2 Dominant position (Article 82142)
The Commission notices that the incumbent TOs will remain dominant for some
time after the liberalisation since they control the PSTN. Therefore, dominance
stemming from control of facilities is considered to be the most relevant to the
Commission's appraisal of access agreements.143 The existence of other
networks, but also potential competition is supposed to be examined when
determining whether an undertaking has a dominant position or not.144
5.2.1 Joint dominant position
The Commission considers that the words in Article 82 ”one or more
undertakings of a dominant position” mean that a dominant position could be
shared.145
”For two or more companies to be in a joint dominant position, they must
together have substantially the same position vis-à-vis their customers and
competitors as a single company has if it is in a dominant position. With specific
reference to the telecommunications sector, joint dominance could be attained by
two telecommunications infrastructure operators covering the same geographic
market.”146
It is considered that for two or more companies to be jointly dominant, it is
necessary, though not sufficient, for there to be no effective competition between
the companies on the relevant market. According to the Commission, it is not
necessary that this is due to agreements, it is a sufficient economic link if there is
                                                
141 Ibid., paragraph 96.
142 This article had the number 86 before the ratification of the Amsterdam Treaty.
143 Notice on the application of the competition rules to access agreements in the
telecommunications sector - framework, relevant markets and principles, O.J. 1998, C 265/2,
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the kind of interdependence which often comes about in oligopolistic situations.147
The Commission consider that a situation of joint dominance may occur if access
to the local loop is controlled by two operators, the incumbent TO and a cable
TV operator. To provide services, access to one of the two networks is
necessary.148
Behaviour by one of several jointly dominant companies may be abusive even if
others’ behaviour are not.149
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6 Essential facilities for
telecom?
6.1 The essential facility test applied on the
telecom market
6.1.1 The facility is controlled by a monopolist
The MCI v. AT&T test quoted above uses the word ”monopolist”, while the EC
law has the concept of ”a dominant undertaking” (Article 82 and B & I Line v.
Sealink above). There is probably no major difference, as a monopolist on the
up-stream market, the undertaking is dominant on the down-stream market.
An interesting idea is the concept of ”joint dominance”. That two or more
companies in an oligopolistic situation may be jointly dominant if there is no
effective competition between them. With an agreement between them about
sharing the market it would have been an abuse of Article 81, but the Commission
does not find that necessary for ”joint dominance”.
There is a number of cases concerning mergers dealing with a concept of
”collective dominance”. In the Kali und Salz case, the Court uses the concept,
but did not find it established since ”the cluster of structural links between [the
two dominant undertakings] (...) is not in the end as tight or as conclusive as the
Commission sought to make out”.150 Neither was it shown that there was no
effective competitive counterweight to them.151 Ysewyn & Caffarra points out that
from an economic point of view, ”there is no basis for a rule that the existence of
”structural links” is a necessary condition for co-ordination between firms”.152 In
Gencor Ltd v. Commission of the European Communities, the CFI found that
”the concentration would have led to the creation of a dominant duopoly”153 and
noted that ”[a] concentration which creates or strengthens a dominant position on
the part of the parties to the concentration with an entity not involved in the
concentration is liable to prove incompatible with the system of undistorted
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competition laid down by the Treaty”.154 Pitt regards however the whole concept
of joint dominance as ”an artificial construct”.155
When establishing that an undertaking has a dominant position, the relevant
market first must be defined. The Commission uses the expression ”covering the
same geographic market”.156 If such a geographic market is a country, some parts
of the local network would not be essential for the competitor. The competitor
can survive on the national market without having access to the facilities in a
particular town.
In a near future we may see local networks owned by competitive network
providers. Since broadband lines can carry both data, telephony and cable TV, it
is likely that there will only be one connection to each house. The possibility of
competition between the telecom and the cable TV networks may therefore
disappear in the long-run.
With a very narrow market definition, ”provision of services to Mr X”, this single
connection will be essential, even though it may be owned by a company without
significant market power on the national or local level. For Mr X, there are
reasons for this narrow market definition. He can only subscribe to the network
connected to his house. For the competitive service provider, it is probably not
essential to have Mr X as customer as long as it has connections to a reasonable
share of homes or enterprises. With this narrow market definition, the connection
between the switch and the point at a real property where the public network
ends would always be regarded as an essential facility as long as the other
conditions below are met.
The proposal from PTS for new legislation would only regard access networks
owned by licence-holders notified to the Commission as having significant market
power in Sweden. But if the narrow market definition above would be accepted,
general competition rules would unbundle smaller networks as well.
Westin considers that the essential facility must have been built up protected by a
legal monopoly or been paid for by public funds, and not by an operator which
has been able to create a strong position by commercial risk-taking on an
competitive market.157 There are reasons for this, without incentives to construct
networks, there may not be any. One of the main issues if small networks were
essential facilities would then be the rates for the access. The Commission talks
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(1999) 4 ECLR 245, at 247.
156 Notice on the application of the competition rules to access agreements in the
telecommunications sector - framework, relevant markets and principles, O.J. 1998, C 265/2,
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157 Westin, Jacob, Access till telenätet - om begreppet nödvändiga faciliteter och
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about ”the reasonable and non-discriminatory price”.158 For an independent
network created on a competitive market, that should include a reasonable
profit.159
Pitt criticizes the whole use of the general competition rules in Articles 81 and 82
for the telecommunications sector. In particular he criticizes attempts to describe
parts of the networks as an essential facility to which it would be an abuse to
refuse others access. ”It is (...) very artificial to say that the operator of any local
loop is ”dominant”, in competition law terms, in controlling access to its
customers.”160
6.1.2 The facility can not practically or reasonably be
duplicated
In both US (City of Anaheim v. Southern California Edison Co.) and EC
(Bronner) law, it is not enough that access would benefit the competitor, there
must be no economically feasible alternatives so the refusal would eliminate all
competition in the actual market. In the telecom market there are alternatives.
Both cable TV network and wireless access are already used for telephony
services. Less advantageous for the competitor, but so were Bronner’s
alternatives as well. The Commission does however not regard these alternatives
as satisfactory yet.161 There are reasons for opening the existing network for
everyone; it is built under a monopoly situation with public funding. But there are
doubts whether it is correct to motivate it with a lack of alternatives without
violating the principles in the Bronner case. In a number of member states, the
access network is or may become more or less unbundled under national
legislation, but how would the EC courts rule if the issue was if general
competition rules can enforce access to the local network?
6.1.3 The competitor is denied to use the facility
The Commission gives three scenarios for denial, refusal to grant access to a
service another operator has been granted (discrimination), refusal to grant access
to a service which no other operator has been granted, and withdrawal of an
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existing access.162 The rates for the service may also be unreasonable high, in that
case the service provider is denied access to a reasonable price.
6.1.4 The owner could have provided access
Sufficient capacity must be available and there must be no objective justifications.
There is probably nothing controversial in this. Technical unfeasibility may
however be used as a reason for not providing access if the NRA is not
supervising the market carefully.
6.2 New technology as essential facilities;
enough incentives for inventions and
investments?
It is in the interest of the whole society that transmission capacity is constructed.
A modern infrastructure is important for other industries’ opportunities to
compete on the world market.
It is therefore important that the legislation regarding the use of connections
promote investments in new such infrastructure. If an investor can expect that
others will have access to his network as soon as it will be profitable, will that
investor build that network?
This is of course an issue for all discussions about the use of the essential facility
doctrine, but unwillingness to invest is especially dangerous in fields with a fast
technical progress. There are reasons for such concerns, the low interconnection
rates in Germany are considered to have involved decreased incentives for new
network operators to construct their own networks.163
It is nevertheless necessary with special rules giving access to the former
monopolies’ networks to promote competition. They have not achieved their
advantage through foresight or capability of innovation, it is a rest of their former
positions as public monopolies. But, on the other hand, it is in the public interest
that they will invest in new technologies too, not only the new operators.
There are advantages with the Dutch model. The rates for access to the local
network will gradually rise making the owner able to make a profit in a couple of
years. These asymmetrical conditions may reduce the ”unfair” advantage of the
old monopoly, but may promote new investments as well. The competitors have a
right to access, but after the transition period they will have to pay a price which
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makes the network management profitable. In the long run, that is probably
necessary. To make the consumer able to choose service provider, access should
be open to all networks, but the rates for it must promote investments.
There are a number of models for stipulating a fair rate for access, but the one
used should probably include more than the costs.
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7 Conclusions and thoughts
about the future
In both US and the EC, a sector specific telecommunications legislation has been
used instead of relaying on general competition rules. New Zealand has chosen
the other way, but the Kiwi experience regarding interconnection is considered to
show that the ordinary competition law is insufficient to grant access to new
competitors.164 The special conditions in the telecom market, with dominant
undertakings which have got their positions in a monopoly situation, make special
asymmetrical rules necessary. In the long run, all operators should however be
treated in the same way. The fast technical progress, where the value of old
connections may be limited, may accelerate the process towards a working
competitive market. New operators which invest in broadband connections may
achieve a substantial share of the market. But to see these investments, it is
necessary that they can be profitable.
In the future, we will probably see more of the congruence between markets
which traditionally are separated. On the American market, there has been a
number of mergers between telecom and cable TV companies in the latest
years.165 The same process will probably take place in Europe, even though it has
just started on this continent. One of the Commission’s requirements for
approving the Telia-Telenor merger is that the cable TV affiliates will be sold. The
future may give us a number of interesting cases regarding mergers in the telecom
sector.
Should a company be allowed to own infrastructure and provide services at the
same time? If not, there are of course more or less far-reaching ways to realize it.
The IT Infrastructure Commission considers that Telia’s access network should
form a separate company within the group.166 Directive 1999/64/EC requires it
for cable TV networks. A separation would make the supervision easier, but it is
also a question of proportionality. Are there less far-reaching alternatives to
achieve the goal of non-discriminatory access to transmission capacity?
The present situation on the telecom market is that a number of former
monopolists still have advantages achieved during the years of monopolies. To
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create a working competitive market, it is probably necessary to reduce these
advantages by restricting these undertakings’ freedom of action. The cable TV
directive of 1999 is therefore valuable, but it is not possible to conclude yet
whether it is sufficient or not. But to go as far as prohibiting service providers
from owning infrastructure is probably incompatible with the principle of
proportionality. One disadvantage with such a solution is that technologies may be
unmodern and there are no reasons for prohibiting companies from owning
unmodern equipment.
The entrance of new technologies may change the application of the essential
facilities doctrine in the telecom sector. A facility which one year may be regarded
as essential and unduplicable may not be it next year. The capacity of the mobile
networks can be increased with GPRS (General Packet Radio Services) or
UMTS (Universal Mobile Telecommunications System) and they may therefore
be regarded as a feasible alternative to the fixed network.
The essentiality of a facility may change over time. 150 years ago, ”Göta kanal”
could have been regarded as an essential facility for transports in the East-West
direction in Sweden. With the entrance of railways and more decent roads, the
canal became less important. The same thing may happen with the old telephony
network. It may therefore be unnecessary to separate it from the provision of
services.
After all, it is possible to construct new networks. Maybe the most essential
facility is not the network, but the customers. If telecom operators were not
obliged to interconnect with each other under reasonable conditions, users could
only communicate with other subscribers of the same network. Without the
possibility to call the 98% of the Swedish households which are subscribers at
Telia, it would be impossible for competitive operators to sell their services.
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Supplement - extract from US
Telecommunications Act of
1996
SEC. 251. [47 U.S.C. 251] INTERCONNECTION.
        (a) GENERAL DUTY OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS CARRIERS.--Each 
telecommunications carrier has the duty--
                (1) to interconnect directly or indirectly with the facilities and equipment of 
other telecommunications carriers; and
                (2) not to install network features, functions, or capabilities that do not comply 
with the guidelines and standards established pursuant to section 255 or 
256.
        (b) OBLIGATIONS OF ALL LOCAL EXCHANGE CARRIERS.--Each local exchange
carrier has the following duties:
                (1) RESALE.--The duty not to prohibit, and not to impose 
unreasonable or discriminatory conditions or limitations on, the resale of
its telecommunications services.
                (2) NUMBER PORTABILITY.--The duty to provide, to the extent technically 
feasible, number portability in accordance with requirements prescribed by 
the Commission.
                (3) DIALING PARITY.--The duty to provide dialing parity to competing providers
of telephone exchange service and telephone toll service, and the duty to
permit all such providers to have nondiscriminatory access to telephone numbers,
operator services, directory assistance, and directory listing, with no
unreasonable dialing delays.
                (4) ACCESS TO RIGHTS-OF-WAY.--The duty to afford access to the poles, 
ducts, conduits, and rights-of-way of such carrier to competing providers of
telecommunications services on rates, terms, and conditions that are 
consistent with section 224.
                (5) RECIPROCAL COMPENSATION.--The duty to establish reciprocal 
compensation arrangements for the transport and termination of 
telecommunications.
        (c) ADDITIONAL OBLIGATIONS OF INCUMBENT LOCAL EXCHANGE 
CARRIERS.--In addition to the duties contained in subsection (b), each 
incumbent local exchange carrier has the following duties:
                (1) DUTY TO NEGOTIATE.--The duty to negotiate in good faith in 
accordance with section 252 the particular terms and conditions of 
agreements to fulfill the duties described in paragraphs (1) through (5) of 
subsection (b) and this subsection. The requesting telecommunications 
carrier also has the duty to negotiate in good faith the terms and
conditions of such agreements.
                (2) INTERCONNECTION.--The duty to provide, for the facilities and equipment
of any requesting telecommunications carrier, interconnection with the local exchange
carrier's network--
                        (A) for the transmission and routing of telephone exchange service and
exchange access;
                        (B) at any technically feasible point within the carrier's network;
                        (C) that is at least equal in quality to that provided by the local exchange
carrier to itself or to any subsidiary, affiliate, or any other party to which the
carrier provides interconnection; and
                        (D) on rates, terms, and conditions that are just, reasonable, and
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nondiscriminatory, in accordance with the terms and conditions of the 
agreement and the requirements of this section and section 252.
                (3) UNBUNDLED ACCESS.--The duty to provide, to any requesting
telecommunications carrier for the provision of a telecommunications 
service, nondiscriminatory access to network elements on an unbundled 
basis at any technically feasible point on rates, terms, and conditions that 
are just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory in accordance with the terms 
and conditions of the agreement and the requirements of this section and 
section 252. An incumbent local exchange carrier shall provide such 
unbundled network elements in a manner that allows requesting carriers to 
combine such elements in order to provide such telecommunications 
service.
                (4) RESALE.--The duty--
                        (A) to offer for resale at wholesale rates any telecommunications service
that the carrier provides at retail to subscribers who are not 
telecommunications carriers; and
                        (B) not to prohibit, and not to impose unreasonable or discriminatory
conditions or limitations on, the resale of such telecommunications service,
except that a State commission may, consistent with regulations prescribed 
by the Commission under this section, prohibit a reseller that obtains at 
wholesale rates a telecommunications service that is available at retail only 
to a category of subscribers from offering such service to a different
category of subscribers.
                (5) NOTICE OF CHANGES.--The duty to provide reasonable public notice of
changes in the information necessary for the transmission and routing of
services using that local exchange carrier's facilities or networks, as well as
of any other changes that would affect the interoperability of those facilities
and networks.
                (6) COLLOCATION.--The duty to provide, on rates, terms, and conditions 
that are just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory, for physical collocation of
equipment necessary for interconnection or access to unbundled network 
elements at the premises of the local exchange carrier, except that the carrier 
may provide for virtual collocation if the local exchange carrier 
demonstrates to the State commission that physical collocation is not 
practical for technical reasons or because of space limitations.
        (d) IMPLEMENTATION.--
                (1) IN GENERAL.--Within 6 months after the date of enactment of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, the Commission shall complete all 
actions necessary to establish regulations to implement the requirements of 
this section.
                (2) ACCESS STANDARDS.--In determining what network elements should 
be made available for purposes of subsection (c)(3), the Commission shall 
consider, at a minimum, whether--
                        (A) access to such network elements as are proprietary in nature is
necessary; and
                        (B) the failure to provide access to such network elements would impair 
the ability of the telecommunications carrier seeking access to provide the 
services that it seeks to offer.
                (3) PRESERVATION OF STATE ACCESS REGULATIONS.--In prescribing 
and enforcing regulations to implement the requirements of this section, the
Commission shall not preclude the enforcement of any regulation, order, or 
policy of a State commission that--
                        (A) establishes access and interconnection obligations of local exchange
carriers;
                        (B) is consistent with the requirements of this section; and
                        (C) does not substantially prevent implementation of the requirements of 
this section and the purposes of this part.
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        (e) NUMBERING ADMINISTRATION.--
                (1) COMMISSION AUTHORITY AND JURISDICTION.--The Commission 
shall create or designate one or more impartial entities to administer 
telecommunications numbering and to make such numbers available on an 
equitable basis. The Commission shall have exclusive jurisdiction over 
those portions of the North American Numbering Plan that pertain to the 
United States. Nothing in this paragraph shall preclude the Commission 
from delegating to State commissions or other entities all or any portion of 
such jurisdiction.
                (2)  COSTS.--The cost of establishing telecommunications numbering
administration arrangements and number portability shall be borne by all
telecommunications carriers on a competitively neutral basis as determined 
by the Commission.
        (f) EXEMPTIONS, SUSPENSIONS, AND MODIFICATIONS.--
                (1) EXEMPTION FOR CERTAIN RURAL TELEPHONE COMPANIES.--
                        (A) EXEMPTION.--Subsection (c) of this section shall not apply to a 
rural telephone company until (i) such company has received a bona fide 
request for interconnection, services, or network elements, and (ii) the State 
commission determines (under subparagraph (B)) that such request is not 
unduly economically burdensome, is technically feasible, and is consistent 
with section 254 (other than subsections (b)(7) and (c)(1)(D) thereof).
                        (B) STATE TERMINATION OF EXEMPTION AND 
IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE.--The party making a bona fide request 
of a rural telephone company for interconnection, services, or network 
elements shall submit a notice of its request to the State commission. The 
State commission shall conduct an inquiry for the purpose of determining 
whether to terminate the exemption under subparagraph (A). Within 120 
days after the State commission receives notice of the request, the State 
commission shall terminate the exemption if the request is not unduly 
economically burdensome, is technically feasible, and is consistent with 
section 254 (other than subsections (b)(7) and (c)(1)(D) thereof). Upon 
termination of the exemption, a State commission shall establish an 
implementation schedule for compliance with the request that is consistent 
in time and manner with Commission regulations.
                        (C) LIMITATION ON EXEMPTION.--The exemption provided by this 
paragraph shall not apply with respect to a request under subsection (c) 
from a cable operator providing video programming, and seeking to provide 
any telecommunications service, in the area in which the rural telephone 
company provides video programming. The limitation contained in this 
subparagraph shall not apply to a rural telephone company that is
providing video programming on the date of enactment of the Telecommunications 
Act of 1996.
                (2) SUSPENSIONS AND MODIFICATIONS FOR RURAL CARRIERS.--A 
local exchange carrier with fewer than 2 percent of the Nation's subscriber 
lines installed in the aggregate nationwide may petition a State 
commission for a suspension or modification of the application of a 
requirement or requirements of subsection (b) or (c) to telephone exchange 
service facilities specified in such petition. The State commission shall 
grant such petition to the extent that, and for such duration as, the State 
commission determines that such suspension or modification--
                        (A) is necessary--
                                (i) to avoid a significant adverse economic impact on users of
telecommunications services generally;
                                (ii) to avoid imposing a requirement that is unduly economically 
burdensome; or
                                (iii) to avoid imposing a requirement that is technically infeasible; 
and
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                        (B)  is consistent with the public interest, convenience, and necessity.
        The State commission shall act upon any petition filed under this 
paragraph within 180 days after receiving such petition. Pending such 
action, the State commission may suspend enforcement of the requirement 
or requirements to which the petition applies with respect to the petitioning 
carrier or carriers.
        (g) CONTINUED ENFORCEMENT OF EXCHANGE ACCESS AND 
INTERCONNECTION REQUIREMENTS.--On and after the date of 
enactment of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, each local exchange 
carrier, to the extent that it provides wireline services, shall provide 
exchange access, information access, and exchange services for such
access to interexchange carriers and information service providers in accordance 
with the same equal access and nondiscriminatory interconnection 
restrictions and obligations (including receipt of compensation) that apply 
to such carrier on the date immediately preceding the date of enactment of 
the Telecommunications Act of 1996 under any court order, consent decree,
or regulation, order, or policy of the Commission, until such restrictions 
and obligations are explicitly superseded by regulations prescribed by the 
Commission after such date of enactment. During the period beginning on 
such date of enactment and until such restrictions and obligations are so 
superseded, such restrictions and obligations shall be enforceable in the 
same manner as regulations of the Commission.
        (h) DEFINITION OF INCUMBENT LOCAL EXCHANGE CARRIER.--
                (1) DEFINITION.--For purposes of this section, the term ''incumbent local 
exchange carrier'' means, with respect to an area, the local exchange carrier 
that--
                        (A) on the date of enactment of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 
provided telephone exchange service in such area; and
                        (B)(i) on such date of enactment, was deemed to be a member of the 
exchange carrier association pursuant to section 69.601(b) of the 
Commission's regulations (47 C.F.R. 69.601(b)); or
                        (ii) is a person or entity that, on or after such date of enactment, became a
successor or assign of a member described in clause (i).
                (2) TREATMENT OF COMPARABLE CARRIERS AS INCUMBENTS.-- The
Commission may, by rule, provide for the treatment of a local exchange carrier (or class
or category thereof) as an incumbent local exchange carrier for purposes of this
section if--
                        (A) such carrier occupies a position in the market for telephone exchange
service within an area that is comparable to the position occupied by a 
carrier described in paragraph (1);
                        (B) such carrier has substantially replaced an incumbent local exchange
carrier described in paragraph (1); and
                        (C) such treatment is consistent with the public interest, convenience, and
necessity and the purposes of this section.
        (i) SAVINGS PROVISION.--Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit or 
otherwise affect the Commission's authority under section 201.
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